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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
No 11-cv-4938 (JFB) (GRB)
De n ise  Sa m -Se k u r ,
Plaintiff,
VERSUS
Th e  Wh it m o r e  Gr o u p , Lt d .,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
June 15, 2012
Joseph F. B ianco, District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Denise Sam-Sekur 
(“plaintiff’ or “Sam-Sekur”) brings this 
action against the Whitmore Group, Ltd. 
(“defendant” or “Whitmore”) alleging 
violations of Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112, as well as state law claims for 
defamation, wrongful termination, and 
breach of contract. In particular, plaintiff 
alleges that defendant failed to promote her, 
failed to provide her with a salary increase, 
and terminated her because she was 
pregnant and suffered from illnesses 
following her pregnancy.
For the reasons set forth below, the 
Court dismisses plaintiff’ s claims under the 
ADA. The Court finds that plaintiff failed to 
timely exhaust her administrative remedies 
with respect to her claims that defendant 
failed to promote her or to give her a raise, 
though plaintiff’ s claims concerning her
J . O .  V j U V E K I N I V l E I ' .
IN F O R M A T IO N
termination were timely exhausted. In any 
event, the Court finds that plaintiff’ s 
complaint does not sufficiently allege that 
she was “disabled” within the meaning of 
the ADA. In an abundance of caution, 
however, the Court grants plaintiff leave to 
replead her termination claim so that she 
may set forth allegations regarding how, for 
example, her chronic cholecystitis was 
linked to her pregnancy, and the duration of 
the illness. Furthermore, the Court grants 
plaintiff leave to replead her termination 
claim under the pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, which amended Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit 
discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
Case 2:11-cv-04938-JFB-GRB Document 18 Filed 06/15/12 Page 2 of 11 PagelD #:
<pageID>
I. Background 
A. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the 
Complaint filed on October 6, 2011, 
(“Compl.”), and are not findings of fact by 
the Court. Instead, the Court will assume the 
facts in the complaint to be true and, for 
purposes of the pending 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, will construe them in a light most 
favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party.
Plaintiff began working for Whitmore on 
December 8, 2007. (Letter from Plaintiff to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“Letter to the EEOC”) (June 
14, 2011).1) She worked in the Funeral 
Department for Roseanne Manger
(“Manger”) until she was transferred in 
March 2008 to the General Business
Department, where she was Darcy
Peterson’s (“Peterson”) assistant. (Id.) 
Plaintiff alleges that she was promised a 
raise after six months of employment, 
provided that she had a good review. (Id.) 
Although plaintiff received a “great verbal 
review,” she received no salary increase. 
(Id.) Plaintiff continued to “play[] the raise 
game” with George Custance (“Custance”), 
the manager of the General Business 
Department. (Id.) He claimed there was a 
freeze on raises due to the economy, but 
plaintiff alleges that the defendant 
nonetheless embarked on a costly renovation 
and gave select employees raises. (Id.) 
Later, plaintiff assumed Peterson’s 
responsibilities when Peterson was given a 
different position. (Id.) She was again 
promised a raise, which she never received. 
(Id.) At that point, plaintiff knew she was
1 Plaintiff s complaint is very brief. Most of the 
allegations are contained in the Letter to the 
EEOC, which plaintiff annexed to her 
complaint.
pregnant, but feared that “once they knew,” 
she would never get a raise. (Id.)
In January 2009, plaintiff told Peterson 
she was pregnant. (Id.) Peterson “literally 
screamed at me voicing her displeasure that 
I was pregnant, blaming me that her new 
position now has to be detained.” (Id.) 
Plaintiff alleges that Custance told her not to 
tell anyone she was pregnant until after he 
advised the owner. (Id.) Plaintiff later 
informed the owner, Jim Metzger 
(“Metzger”), that she was pregnant, 
explaining that she had not said anything 
sooner because of an earlier miscarriage and 
because of “the raise [she] was expecting.” 
(Id.) She did not receive the raise or the 
promotion. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that she was treated 
differently than three other pregnant women 
in the office. (Id.) They were all given baby 
showers, but plaintiff was not given a baby 
shower, and, while in the hospital, plaintiff 
received no card, flowers, or phone calls. 
(Id.) When she returned to work, plaintiff 
was treated like the “office pariah.” (Id.) 
Peterson allegedly told “her friends in 
management” that plaintiff was “married 
having another man’s baby.” (Id.) One 
employee in the Funeral Department told 
plaintiff that Manger had said plaintiff was 
married and having another man’s baby. 
(Id.) Plaintiff notes that this employee is 
willing to testify that she was promised a 
raise six months after employment, and 
“actually received it.” (Id.)
Defendant subsequently gave plaintiff’s 
promotion to a new hire named Diana 
Bertoni (“Bertoni”) at a salary of $80,000 
per year. (Id.) When plaintiff returned from 
leave, Bertoni became her supervisor. (Id.) 
After returning from leave, plaintiff had 
many medical problems. (Id.) In August 
2010, Bertoni told plaintiff that if she was 
“out sick again,” she could not “guarantee”
2
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that plaintiff would be able to keep her job. 
(Id.; Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Intake Questionnaire (“EEOC 
charge”), June 14, 2011 (attached to Compl. 
at 10 ).) As a result, plaintiff emailed 
Metzger to provide the exact details for why 
she was out of the office. (Letter to the 
EEOC.) According to the email to Metzger, 
which plaintiff attaches to her complaint, 
plaintiff experienced the following: a breast 
cancer scare on December 31, 2009; an 
appendectomy in March 2010; an infection 
from an IUD, which was removed on July 
14, 2010; and an infected oral implant, 
which was removed on August 2, 2010. 
(Email from Plaintiff to James Metzger 
(Aug. 9, 2010).)
On June 16, 2010, plaintiff emailed 
Custance, again asking for a raise. (Id.) She 
received a small increase that was not 
retroactive. (Id.) On August 23, 2010, 
Peterson forced plaintiff to stay late in order 
to rewrite two canceled policies. (Letter to 
the EEOC.) Plaintiff had to stay until 5:30 
p.m. to handle the rewrite for Peterson’s 
customer. (Id.)
On October 28, 2010, two days after 
returning from being out sick, plaintiff was 
terminated. (EEOC charge.) Custance and 
the CFO, Geraldine Schnatz, told plaintiff 
that her termination was due to downsizing. 
(Id.) Plaintiff alleges, however, that at least 
three new hires were permitted to keep their 
jobs. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the basis for 
the adverse actions was “pregnancy and 
illness post pregnancy.” (Id.)
Prior to commencing this lawsuit, 
plaintiff completed and filed an EEOC 
charge, dated June 14, 2011. Plaintiff noted 
in her Letter to the EEOC that she was 
aware that there were time constraints “on 2
2 Page references indicate the page numbers 
assigned by the ECF docketing system.
these matters,” but was afraid to contact the 
EEOC because of fears of retaliation and/or 
losing her job. (Letter to the EEOC.) The 
EEOC charge asserts a claim for 
discrimination pursuant to disability and 
pregnancy arising from “pregnancy and 
illness post pregnancy.” On July 11, 2011, 
the EEOC sent plaintiff a Dismissal and 
Notice of Rights (“Right to Sue Letter”). In 
the Right to Sue Letter, the EEOC explained 
that it was closing plaintiff’ s file because it 
was unable to conclude that defendant 
violated any statute under its jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff was given 90 days to file a lawsuit 
based on the EEOC charge. She filed this 
lawsuit within 90 days.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action 
on October 6, 2011. Defendant moved to 
dismiss on January 9, 2012. Plaintiff filed an 
affirmation in opposition on February 13, 
2012. Defendant replied on February 24, 
2012. The Court has fully considered the 
arguments and submissions of the parties.
II. Standard of Review
When a Court reviews a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim for which 
relief can be granted, it must accept the 
factual allegations set forth in the complaint 
as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v.
Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 
2006); Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 
421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). “In order 
to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible 
set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level.’” 
Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. 
Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 
86, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007)). This standard does not require
3
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“heightened fact pleading of specifics, but 
only enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 
U S. at 570.
The Supreme Court clarified the 
appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, setting forth a two-pronged approach 
for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. 556 
U S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). The 
Court instructed district courts to first 
“identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are 
no more than conclusions, are not entitled to 
the assumption of truth.” 129 S.Ct. at 1950. 
Though “legal conclusions can provide the 
framework of a complaint, they must be 
supported by factual allegations.” Id. 
Second, if a complaint contains “well- 
pleaded factual allegations, a court should 
assume their veracity and then determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief.” Id.
The Court notes that in adjudicating a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is entitled to 
consider: “(1) facts alleged in the complaint 
and documents attached to it or incorporated 
in it by reference, (2) documents ‘integral’ 
to the complaint and relied upon in it, even 
if not attached or incorporated by reference, 
(3) documents or information contained in 
defendant’s motion papers if plaintiff has 
knowledge or possession of the material and 
relied on it in framing the complaint, (4) 
public disclosure documents required by law 
to be, and that have been, filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
(5) facts of which judicial notice may 
properly be taken under Rule 201 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.” In re Merrill 
Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 356-57 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal citations omitted), 
aff’d  in part and reversed in part on other 
grounds sub nom., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch 
& Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 935 (2005); see also 
Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949
F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he district 
court . . . could have viewed [the
documents] on the motion to dismiss 
because there was undisputed notice to 
plaintiffs of their contents and they were 
integral to plaintiffs’ claim.”); Brodeur v. 
City o f New York, No. 04 Civ. 1859 (JG), 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10865, at *9-10 
(E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2005) (court could 
consider documents within the public 
domain on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss).
III. D iscussion
A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies
As a threshold matter, defendant 
contends that plaintiff failed to file a timely 
EEoC charge because she “knew or had 
reason to know of the injury serving as the 
basis for” some of her claims at least as 
early as June 2009, yet she did not file her 
EEOC charge within the requisite 300 days. 
See Harris v. City o f New York, 186 F.3d 
243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999). The Court agrees 
that plaintiff’ s claims that she was passed 
over for a promotion and a raise accrued, at 
the latest, when she returned from maternity 
leave, are not subject to equitable tolling, 
and do not fall within the “continuing 
violation” exception. Accordingly, the raise 
and promotion claims are time-barred. 
Plaintiff’ s claim that she was terminated on 
the basis of disability is, however, timely.
1. Applicable Law
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, which is 
incorporated by reference into the ADA by 
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), a plaintiff in New 
York has 300 days from the date of accrual 
to file an ADA charge with the EEOC. See 
Harris, 186 F.3d at 247-48. A claim under 
the ADA accrues when the plaintiff “knew
4
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or had reason to know of the injury serving 
as the basis for his claim.” Id. at 247.
“Termination, failure to promote, and 
refusal to hire are considered ‘discrete acts’ 
which are ‘easy to identify’ and claims 
based on each are barred if not timely filed.” 
Valtchev v. City o f New York, 400 F. App’x 
586, 588, (2d Cir. 2010). There is an 
exception, however, for discriminatory acts 
that are “part of a continuing policy and 
practice of prohibited discrimination.” Id. 
Under this “continuing violation” exception 
to the limitations period, if a plaintiff “files 
an EEOC charge that is timely as to any 
incident of discrimination in furtherance of 
an ongoing policy of discrimination, all 
claims of acts of discrimination under that 
policy will be timely even if they would be 
untimely standing alone.” Lambert v. 
Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 
1993), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). The 
continuing violation exception applies “to 
cases involving specific discriminatory 
policies or mechanisms,” but does not apply 
to “multiple incidents of discrimination, 
even similar ones, that are not the result of a 
discriminatory policy or mechanism.” Id.
“When determining whether equitable 
tolling is applicable, a district court must 
consider whether the person seeking 
application of the equitable tolling doctrine 
(1) has ‘acted with reasonable diligence 
during the time period she seeks to have 
tolled,’ and (2) has ‘proved that the 
circumstances are so extraordinary that the 
doctrine should apply.’” Zerilli-Edelglass v. 
N.Y. City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80-81 
(2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Chapman v. 
ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability 
Plan, 288 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 2002)); see 
also South v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 28 F.3d 
9, 12 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that the 
principles of equitable tolling do not extend
to what “is at best a garden variety claim of 
excusable neglect” (citation and quotation 
marks omitted)). The “burden of 
demonstrating the appropriateness of 
equitable tolling . . . lies with the plaintiff.” 
Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 
2000); see also Smith v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, No. 97 Civ. 4507 (LMM), 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14711, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
18, 1998) (“[A] court must consider the 
equities of the excuse offered to explain the 
delay and may extend the limitations period 
if warranted.”).
2. Application
Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to 
exhaust her administrative remedies by 
filing an EEOC charge within 300 days of 
the accrual of her claim, since she knew that 
she had been passed over for a promotion 
and raise when she returned from maternity 
leave in June 2009, yet she did not file an 3
3 Plaintiff s complaint does not provide the exact 
date of her leave pursuant to the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Defendant 
attaches a letter to its motion to dismiss 
indicating that plaintiff was granted FLMA 
leave from March 23, 2009 through June 12, 
2009. (Letter from Geraldine Schnatz, Office 
Manager, to Plaintiff (Mar. 27, 2009).) The 
Court may consider this letter in adjudicating a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion because “plaintiff ha[d] 
knowledge or possession of the material and 
relied on it in framing the complaint.” See In re 
Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d at 356-57. 
Moreover, as noted supra, plaintiff referred to 
her leave in her complaint without exact dates, 
and did not dispute the dates contained in the 
motion to dismiss. In any event, it is clear from 
the email attached to plaintiff s complaint that 
she had returned to work before August 9, 2010 
and any claim alleging that defendant failed to 
promote or failed to provide a raise to plaintiff 
on the basis of discrimination due to pregnancy 
would have accrued as of her return from leave 
and would be barred by the 300-day requirement 
even if she returned as late as August 9, 2010.
5
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EEOC charge until June 14, 2011. The 
Court agrees that plaintiff’ s claims that she 
was discriminated against on the basis of 
pregnancy when she was passed over for a 
raise and a promotion accrued, at the latest, 
when she returned from maternity leave, 
since “she knew or had reason to know of 
the injury serving as the basis for [her] 
claim.” See Harris, 186 F.3d at 247.
In an addendum to her complaint, 
plaintiff explains that, although she is 
“aware that there are time constraints on 
these matters,” she “wish[es] she would 
have known earlier,” because she “would 
have contacted the EEOC sooner.” (Letter to 
the EEOC.) Plaintiff further states, 
“However, I still would have been afraid of 
retaliation and/or losing my job.” (Id.) 
Plaintiff’ s conclusory statement that she 
would have been afraid of retaliation had 
she filed an EEOC charge is insufficient to 
serve as the basis for equitable tolling. 
Moreover, no other basis for equitable 
tolling has been asserted in this case. Nor 
does the “continuing violation” exception 
apply. There is no evidence that any of the 
isolated acts complained of by plaintiff 
related to any specific discriminatory policy.
Accordingly, because plaintiff did not 
file an EEOC charge until June 14, 2011, 
plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her 
administrative remedies with respect to her 
claims that defendant failed to promote her 
or to give her a raise prior to her pregnancy, 
during her pregnancy, or when she returned 
from leave after giving birth. However, 
plaintiff’ s claim that she was terminated on 
the basis of her pregnancy and post­
pregnancy illnesses was timely exhausted. 
Plaintiff was terminated on October 28,
The only alleged denial of promotion of which 
plaintiff complains was immediately known to 
her upon her return when Bertoni was her new 
boss.
2010, and filed her EEOC charge within 300 
days of her termination.
B. Failure to State a Claim Under the 
ADA
1. Applicable Law
The ADA was enacted by Congress to 
“provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment 
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. 
Title II prohibits disability discrimination by 
public entities in connection with access to 
public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. 
Title III prohibits disability discrimination 
by people who own, lease, or operate places 
of “public accommodation,” such as hotels, 
theaters, grocery stories, and transportation 
centers. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.
Under Title I, the provision at issue, 
employers are prohibited from 
discriminating “on the basis of disability in 
regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(a). Employers must make 
“reasonable accommodations” for qualified 
individuals with a disability, unless the 
employer can show that such an 
accommodation would impose an “undue 
hardship.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
To establish a primafacie case under the 
ADA, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) his employer is subject to the 
ADA; (2) he was disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA; (3) he was 
otherwise qualified to perform the 
essential functions of his job, with or
6
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without reasonable accommodation; 
and (4) he suffered adverse
employment action because of his 
disability.
Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 
740, 747 (2d Cir. 2001).
The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of 
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded 
as having such an impairment (as described 
in paragraph (3)).” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
With respect to an individual who is 
“regarded as having an impairment” under 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C), the individual 
must establish “that he or she has been 
subjected to an action prohibited under this 
Act because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or 
not the impairment limits or is perceived to 
limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(3)(A). However, paragraph (1)(C) 
“shall not apply to impairments that are 
transitory and minor. A transitory 
impairment is an impairment with an actual 
or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).
Congress enacted the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), effective January 
1, 2009, which expanded the class of 
individuals entitled to protection under the 
ADA. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:
In the ADAAA, Congress 
emphasizes that when it enacted the 
ADA in 1990, it “intended that the 
Act ‘provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities’ 
and provide broad coverage.” The 
ADAAA rejects the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the term “disability”
in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 
L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999), and Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. 
v. Williams, 534 U S. 184, 122 S. Ct.
681, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615 (2002), and 
thereby expands the class of 
individuals who are entitled to 
protection under the ADA.
Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. 
Improvement & Power D ist, 555 F.3d 850, 
853 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
Following the amendments, major life 
activities no longer need to be of “central 
importance,” and may include “caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, 
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, 
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, 
communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2)(A).
2. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges that she was 
discriminated against on the basis of 
“pregnancy and post pregnancy illness.” 
(Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff details these post­
pregnancy illnesses in an email attached to 
her complaint, which she sent to Metzger on 
August 9, 2010. They include: a breast 
cancer scare on December 31, 2009; an 
appendectomy in March 2010; an infection 
from an IUD, which was removed on July 
14, 2010; and an infected oral implant, 
which was removed on August 2, 2010. 
(Email from Plaintiff to James Metzger 
(Aug. 9, 2010).) In her opposition, plaintiff 
describes an additional illness. (Pl.’s Opp., 
Feb. 13, 2012, ECF No. 13.) She explains 
that she began to experience “a swelling 
under my right rib,” for which she visited a 
“gastro doctor” in June 2010 and September 
2010. (Id.) After she was terminated on 
October 28, 2010, the swelling “became 
very painful and the fevers were constant.”
7
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(Id.) She saw a series of doctors and was 
ultimately diagnosed with chronic 
cholecystitis, and had her gallbladder 
removed on May 23, 2011. (Id.) Plaintiff 
notes that the Mayo Clinic website states 
that “women who were post pregnancy 
could have this illness.” (Id.) Defendant 
argues that plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate that her “pregnancy and post 
pregnancy illness” constituted a disability 
within the meaning of the ADA.
a. Other Illnesses
As an initial matter, it is clear that 
plaintiff fails to allege a plausible disability 
claim based upon her breast cancer care, 
appendectomy, infection from an IUD, and 
infected oral implant. Each of these illnesses 
is a temporary, short-term impairment that is 
not “substantially limiting” and does not, 
therefore, render a person “disabled” under 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). See Adams v. 
Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d 315, 316­
17 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (temporary 
neck, back, and knee injury lasting three and 
one-half months not a disability); Colwell v. 
Suffolk Cnty. Police D ep ’t, 158 F.3d 635, 
646 (2d Cir. 1998) (seven-month temporary 
impairment was not substantially limiting); 
McNamara v. Tourneau, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 
2d 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d  326 F. 
App’x 68 (2d Cir. 2009) (back and leg 
injury lasting only eight weeks was not 
substantially limiting); Williams v. Salvation 
Army, 108 F. Supp. 2d 303, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (temporary effects as a result of blunt 
head trauma did not give rise to a disability 
within the meaning of the ADA).
Nor do these illnesses qualify as 
disabilities under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). 
As discussed above, to qualify as an 
individual who is “regarded as having an 
impairment” under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1)(C), the individual must establish 
“that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under this Act because of 
an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment 
limits or is perceived to limit a major life 
activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). 
However, paragraph (1)(C) “shall not apply 
to impairments that are transitory and minor. 
A transitory impairment is an impairment 
with an actual or expected duration of 6 
months or less.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). 
Plaintiff’ s breast cancer care, appendectomy, 
infection from an IUD, and infected oral 
implant were each “transitory and minor.” 
See White v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 438 F. 
App’x 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff 
could not establish a “regarded as disabled” 
claim because he suffered a transitory 
impairment with a duration of one or two 
months); Dugay v. Complete Skycap Servs., 
Inc., CV 10-2404 (PHX) (GMS), 2011 U S. 
Dist. LEXIS 81829, at *12 (D. Ariz. July 26, 
2011) (three month-long disability resulting 
from car accident was “transitory and 
minor,” and therefore did not qualify the 
plaintiff as disabled).
For these reasons, plaintiff fails to 
qualify as disabled under the ADA as a 
consequence of her breast cancer scare, 
appendectomy, infection from an IUD, or 
infected oral implant.4
Under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B), a person 
qualifies as disabled if he has “a record of such 
an impairment.” The EEOC regulations further 
explain that “[a]n individual has a record of a 
disability if the individual has a history of, or 
has been misclassified as having, a mental or 
physical impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(k); see Colwell, 158 F.3d at 645 
(“Even without a showing of substantial 
limitation of a major life activity, the ADA’s 
definition of ‘disability’ can be satisfied by ‘a 
record’ of an impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities.”) Because this 
Court concludes that plaintiff does not
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b. Pregnancy 
i. Applicable Law
Pregnancy does not typically constitute a 
disability under the ADA. See Leahy v. Gap, 
Inc., Civ. 07-2008, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58812, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008) 
(“‘Every court to consider the question of 
whether pregnancy in and of itself is a 
‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA 
has concluded that it is not.’” (quoting 
Green v. New York City Health and Hosp. 
Corp., 04 Civ. 5144 (PAC), 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2832, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
2008) , aff’d  343 F. App’x 712 (2d Cir.
2009) ); see also Dantuono v. Davis Vision, 
Inc., No. 07-CV-2234 (TCP)(ETB), 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122119, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 29, 2009) (inability to lift more than 
ten pounds as a result of pregnancy was 
temporary, and therefore not a disability).
Moreover, courts generally hold that 
complications arising from pregnancy do not 
qualify as disabilities under the ADA. See 
Conley v. United Parcel Serv., 88 F. Supp. 
2d 16, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). For example, in 
LaCoparra v. Pergament Home Ctrs., Inc., 
982 F. Supp. 213, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), a 
woman who was granted a nine-month leave 
of absence for complications stemming from 
her pregnancy was not considered disabled. 
In Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype Inc., 893 
F. Supp. 109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995), a pregnant 
plaintiff who missed several days of work 
because of ovarian cysts was not disabled.
sufficiently allege an impairment that 
substantially limited a major life activity under 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), and plaintiff does not 
allege that there were records relied on by her 
employer indicating a greater degree of 
limitation than she alleged in her complaint, 
plaintiff fails to qualify as disabled under 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B) with respect to all of her 
claims. See Colwell, 158 F.3d at 645.
Only in extremely rare cases have courts 
found that conditions that arise out of 
pregnancy qualify as a disability. In these 
cases, “it is the physiological impairment 
that results from complications that renders 
the person disabled.” Conley, 88 F. Supp. 2d 
at 20. For example, in Hernandez v. City of 
Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (D. 
Conn. 1997), the premature onset of labor 
that could only be controlled by medication 
constituted a physical impairment, though 
there were genuine issues of material fact as 
to whether the impairment substantially 
limited plaintiff’s ability to work. In 
Patterson by Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 
F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1995), the court 
held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a 
disability where she suffered severe back 
pain from pregnancy, in part because the 
pregnancy aggravated a prior back injury.
ii. Application
The complaint as it is currently drafted 
is insufficient to state a plausible claim 
under the ADA based upon pregnancy or 
pregnancy-related illness, given the lack of 
specificity as to whether plaintiff suffered 
illnesses that were linked to her pregnancy, 
and the duration of those illnesses.
In particular, plaintiff has not alleged 
how her pregnancy substantially limited a 
major life activity. Moreover, as discussed 
supra, temporary impairments, pregnancies, 
and complications arising from pregnancy 
are not typically considered disabilities. 
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged any 
physiological impairments as a consequence 
of her pregnancy that have rendered her 
disabled. Accordingly, based upon the 
current allegations in the complaint, 
plaintiff’s pregnancy does not render her 
disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
Nor does plaintiff’ s pregnancy render 
her disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C)
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because she has not sufficiently alleged that 
she was regarded as having such an 
impairment. Although an individual need 
not demonstrate that her impairment was 
perceived by others to limit a major life 
activity, an individual must still demonstrate 
that she has an impairment. Pregnancy by 
itself, however, is not generally considered 
an impairment. See Marchioli v. Garland 
Co., Inc., 5:11-cv-124 (MAD/ATB), 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54227, at *19-20 
(N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011); Serednyj v. 
Beverly Healthcare LLC, 2:08-CV-4, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38221, *39 (N.D. Ind. 
Apr. 16, 2010), aff’d  656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 
2011). Moreover, as discussed supra, 
plaintiff has not alleged any physiological 
impairment as a result of her pregnancy that 
could conceivably fall within one of the 
extremely rare cases in which courts have 
found that conditions that arise out of 
pregnancy qualify as a disability.
Accordingly, the Court grants 
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’ s 
claim of discrimination under the ADA on 
the basis of her “pregnancy and illness post 
pregnancy.” However, in an abundance of 
caution, the Court grants plaintiff leave to 
replead to provide the plaintiff the 
opportunity to set forth allegations regarding 
how, for example, her chronic cholecystitis 
was linked to her pregnancy, and the 
duration of the illness. In her opposition, 
plaintiff asserts that she suffered from 
chronic cholecystitis, and that the Mayo 
Clinic website states that “women who were 
post pregnancy could have this illness.” 
(Pl.’s Opp., Feb. 13, 2012, ECF No. 13.) 
However, plaintiff did not make these 
allegations in her complaint,5 and her 
opposition does not sufficiently state how
5 The Court notes that plaintiff checked “I do not 
have a disability now but I did have one” in her 
EEOC charge dated June 14, 2011, annexed to 
her complaint.
this illness was linked to her pregnancy and 
the duration of the illness. Thus, the Court 
grants plaintiff leave to replead her 
termination claim so that she may set forth 
allegations regarding how, for example, her 
chronic cholecystitis was linked to her 
pregnancy, and the duration of the illness. 
See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 
(2d Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the Court 
grants plaintiff leave to replead her claims 
under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination “on 
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
IV. Leave to  Replead
The Second Circuit has emphasized that
A pro se complaint is to be read 
liberally. Certainly the court should 
not dismiss without granting leave 
to amend at least once when a 
liberal reading of the complaint 
gives any indication that a valid 
claim might be stated.
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations 
omitted). Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the “court should 
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, 
leave to replead can be denied where it is 
clear that no amendments can cure the 
pleading deficiencies and any attempt to 
replead would be futile. See Cuoco, 222 
F.3d at 112 (“The problem with [plaintiff’ s] 
cause[] of action is substantive; better 
pleading will not cure it. Repleading would 
thus be futile. Such a futile request to 
replead should be denied.”); see also 
Hayden v. Cnty. o f Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 53 
(2d Cir. 1999) (holding that if a plaintiff 
cannot demonstrate he is able to amend his 
complaint “in a manner which would
10
Case 2:11-cv-04938-JFB-GRB Document 18 Filed 06/15/12 Page 11 of 11 PagelD #:
<pageID>
survive dismissal, opportunity to replead is 
rightfully denied”).
As discussed supra, the Court grants 
plaintiff leave to replead her termination 
claim so that she may set forth allegations 
regarding how, for example, her chronic 
cholecystitis was linked to her pregnancy, 
and the duration of the illness. Furthermore, 
the Court grants plaintiff leave to replead 
her termination claim under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, which amended Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
prohibit discrimination “on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s 
motion to dismiss plaintiff’ s complaint, 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, is granted. 
However, in an abundance of caution, the 
Court grants plaintiff leave to replead her 
termination claim to address how, for 
example, her chronic cholecystitis was 
linked to her pregnancy, and the duration of 
the illness. Furthermore, the Court grants 
plaintiff leave to replead her termination 
claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, which amended Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit 
discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 
u .s.C . § 2000e(k).6 Plaintiff may file an 
amended complaint within thirty days of the 
issuance of this Order. Failure to file an 
amended complaint will result in dismissal 
of the complaint with prejudice.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from 
this order would not be taken in good faith; 
therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied 
for purposes of an appeal. See Coppedge v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
JOSEPH F. BIANCO 
United States District Judge
Dated: June 15, 2012
Central Islip, NY
* * *
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, 122 Rocklyn 
Ave., Lynbrook, NY 11563. Defendant is 
represented by Felicia S. Ennis, Jonathan W. 
Rich, and Ronald B. Goodman, Robinson, 
Brog, Leinwand, Greene, Genovese & 
Gluck, PC, 875 Third Avenue 
9th Floor, New York, NY 10022 and 1345 
Ave. of the Americas, 31st Floor, New 
York, NY 10105.
6 Because it is still unclear whether any federal 
claim can survive a motion to dismiss, the Court 
declines at this juncture to exercise jurisdiction 
over any of plaintiff s state law claims.
11
